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Abstract 
The universalistic dimension of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) nature and function 
is clear. Yet, this dimension must be thoroughly defined. We must ask ‘what universalism’? 
A rational approach to international social relations is different from an ethical one. While 
the rational approach may lead to universalization of localized specific moral models (e.g. 
the liberal Western model) promoting its hegemony, the ethical approach promotes diversity 
through considering non-reducible differences and common human phenomena in which 
only a minimal common ethics is universal. This paper argues that the answer to this 
structural question is crucial to understand if the ICC is essentially a hegemonic tool to 
expand the predominant Western liberal model or rather a mechanism to fight impunity 
acknowledging diversity and rooted on an ethical concern.  
We contend that the ICC is immersed in troubled waters where it is not always possible to 
separate a universalizing Western liberal approach from an ethical universal approach. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the Court, even if partially and at times serves as tool for 
hegemony, is essentially defined by the universalization of the fight against impunity 
through reference to a minimal common ethics. 
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1. Introduction 
The Rome Statute which creates the International Criminal Court2 starts with a very 
meaningful statement by which States Parties to the Statute3 affirm that they are 
“conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together 
in a shared heritage, and [are] concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at 
any time”4. The preamble to the Rome Statute also appeals to “the conscience of 
humanity” and to “the peace, security and well-being of the world”5
The universalistic dimension of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) nature and 
function is, therefore, clear. Yet, this dimension must be thoroughly defined. We must 
ask "what universalism"? A rational approach to international social relations is different 
from an ethical one. The rational approach is based on a unique rational process and its 
prioritization - a universal process which can be extended to all human beings. 
Therefore, it would be possible to identify a wide range of interests and objectives 
common to the global community and usually universal and self-evident when deriving 
from a correct deductive rational process which leads to unique and universal truths. 
An ethical approach, on the other hand, resorts to a more subjective analysis based on 
a minimum common ethical ground reached through dialog: diversity, plurality and 
locality are considered more relevant. While the rational approach may lead to 
universalization of localized specific moral models (e.g. the liberal Western model) 
promoting its hegemony, the ethical approach promotes diversity through considering 
non-reducible differences and common human phenomena in which only a minimal 
common ethics is universal. This explains the relevance of understanding which of 
these approaches is that of the ICC. 
. These lines 
evidence the universalistic perspective of an ethics common to all humanity which must 
be protected, disseminated and fostered. It is in this spirit that the President of the 
International Criminal Court, the South Korean judge Sang-Hyun Song, refers to the 
Court as a “moral imperative for humankind” (2013: 4). 
                                                        
2  Formally it is designate Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998. 
3  Currently, 122 States are Parties to the Rome Statute.  
4  See paragraph 1 of the preamble of the Rome Statute.  
5  See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble of the Rome Statute. 
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This paper argues that the reply to this structural issue is crucial to understand if the 
ICC is essentially a hegemonic tool to expand the predominant Western liberal model or 
rather a mechanism to fight impunity regarding diversity and rooted on an axiological 
concern. If the former, the ICC must become irrelevant and we must be glad that it has 
been rarely successful6
Therefore, this paper will firstly analyze the two universalistic approaches - the rational 
and the ethical. Secondly, we aim to integrate the ICC in the analysis considering the 
Court's nature in the international legal order as well as some of the institution's 
features such as, possible selectivity, its relation with the United Nations Security 
Council, its legal-criminal design as well as its complementarity.  
. If the latter, the ICC must be preserved and improved so as to 
make it one of the guardians of international criminal justice in the fight against 
impunity and in the protection and promotion of human being's fundamental rights. 
The universal fight against impunity does not imply universalization of a western liberal 
model and an artificial and hegemonic blurring of what is socially and axiologically 
different. The ICC is immersed in these stormy waters. 
     
2. Which Universalism? 
2.1. Rational Universalism and Universal Ethics 
Any narrative on universalism will always include a universal ethical-legal dimension.  
Therefore, we may distinguish two lines of thinking on universalism: that of tradition, 
which affirms there is universal reasoning common to all human beings; that of post-
positivism, which rejects the concept of universal reasoning and whose concept of 
universality is rather based on the acknowledgment of non-reducible differences from 
which it derives7
                                                        
6  In the past 12 years since the ICC was founded, it has only issued sentencing on the case Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (case ICC-01/04-01/06) e Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (case ICC-01/04-
01/07). At this time, both sentences are still subject to appeal. 
. This means that universality cannot question these non-reducible 
differences but is rather guided by the following joint proportions: non-reducible 
differences and phenomena common to all humanity that require a collective and 
potentially universal response (e.g. climate change). The issue of knowing whether 
different social communities are forced to be part of a universal discourse is less 
7  The debates on universalism - its defense, refusal or mitigation - derive from different epistemological 
attitudes. The differences are striking in positivist discourses (also defined as ‘tradition’ or ‘orthodox’) and 
in post-positivist ones, whose criticism to the predominant liberal approaches is at the bases of their 
narrative.  ‘Positivism’ is the name given to the school of thought that advocates that knowledge of the 
world is based on experience, observation and verification - a method very similar to that of natural 
sciences - this providing theoretical thought focused on problem resolution, its bases being supposedly 
objective and justified by repeatedly registered facts. This is the predominant scientific approach today 
and the most appealing (because it deals with power at the proclaimed end of history) - in International 
Law and in International Relations as well - that post-positivists usually designate as ‘positivism’. 
Positivism involves a cartesian separation between mind and matter, between subject and object. The 
positivist researchers aim that values and interests do not interfere in their observation, reading and 
analysis of empirical data - neutral objectivity - thus searching for the one solution - the ‘truth’ - deducted 
using reason supposedly universal. 
 On the other hand, post-positivism searches new models that overcome the shortcomings of the positivist 
approach. Positivists advocate a research model that acknowledges the gap between subject and object; 
post-positivists, on the other hand, claim that all knowledge is contextual and that subjectivity cannot and 
should not be banned. The post-positivist approach therefore refuses dichotomies' empiricism (true/false, 
good/bad, war/peace) and proposes a less naive and more sophisticated general approach, where there 
are no truths solely guided by reason. All this has led ‘tradition’ theories being questioned by post-
positivist approaches, mainly through critical theory. 
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important than the debates on the nature of real dialog and its subjective scope 
(Linklater, 1998).  
Universalism is, therefore, ‘all that separates us and all that unites us’. The question is, 
then, ‘universalism regarding what’? Tradition answers indicating truths found through 
reason. Critical theory, introducing the subjective element, advocates universalism 
based on moral principles that can be operationalized through human being's ability to 
communicate, including within the framework of an institutional architecture that may 
be universal. Reason, according to this perspective, is not the only human feature that 
influences human thought and action - others should be considered such as social, 
cultural, political and economic context as well as other personality-related features.  
Within the framework of post-positivist attitudes, critical theory uses deconstruction of 
hegemonic discourse, program and action. For this approach, reason-based 
universalistic perspective may kill diversity and foster hegemony. Therefore, this 
perspective is cautious in what concerns rules proclaimed as universal which may be 
nothing more than a means of imposing interests and domination by those more 
powerful. Universalism could, then, lead to an expanding hegemony based on a 
national hegemony established by those in power and that would become a pattern to 
be replicated by others. Cox, when discussing the economic aspect of production 
relations, defines hegemony as “an order within a world economy with a dominant 
mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate 
modes of production” (1993: 62). Such expansionism has less resistance from 
peripheral States as if it was a passive revolution.  
As Hoffman (1988) indicates, critical theory resists universalism as means of hegemony 
and rather tries to find a path for a more representative type of universalism. The issue 
is, therefore, not universalism itself but in how the concept is used by power structures, 
in particular the ones based on the liberal Western model.  
Yet, the issue can have a positive reading: that there is a true common ethical basis 
which must be acknowledged so that the limits of diversity can be identified and 
preserved. This common basis exists, therefore, in its own limits which cannot be 
hegemonically expanded beyond diversity and social plurality. However, plural reality 
does coexist with universalistic trends regarding the so-called minimal common ethics 
and cross-cutting issues to all humanity arising in the same historical time.  In that 
regard, Küng states that “for today’s pluralistic society, ethical consensus means the 
necessary agreement in fundamental, ethical standards which […] can serve as the 
smallest possible basis for humans living and acting together” (1997: 97).  
Linklater (1998) highly contributes to understanding this, as the author refers that non-
ethical concept is only satisfactory if based on systematic exclusion of any member of 
the human community who can potentially become universal. Universality is neither the 
essence of Natural Law perspectives nor the teleology of speculative philosophies 
associated to the Enlightenment. Universality becomes a responsibility to address 
others, regardless of their race, nationality or other features, in an open dialog on 
matters regarding their well-being. In fact, there is moral discourse that is cross-
culturally valid. Examples of this are the discourses against slavery, genocide or the 
prevalence of justice and environmental sustainability even in situations of conflict. We 
must also find procedures that tend to be universal and allow peaceful living.  
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A common ethics is visible in legal principles and rights that are present in cultural 
communities where they are accepted with the possible exception of an individual 
anomaly. Their denomination, their content, as well as their interpretation and 
application may vary. Yet these principles' legal and philosophical essence is shared. As 
Kartashkin declares, “toutes les cultures et civilisations partagent, dans leurs traditions, 
coutumes, religions et croyances, un ensemble commun de valeurs traditionnelles qui 
appartiennent à l’humanité dans son ensemble” (2011: 7). The fact that these ethical 
principles are crucial to communities justifies the need for those principles to originate 
at the local level, in a horizontal as well as a vertical bottom-up dialog. 
Justice, in its legal and philosophical dimension, is one of the principles of common 
ethics. International Law aims to apply justice, though it may not do so. Thus, justice 
precedes Law. Rawls enthusiastically states that “justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (1999: 3). Yet, we must not confuse 
liberal precedence of the fair over the good (system of values) mentioned by Rawls 
with precedence of justice over Law. Fairness is defined based on a society's system of 
values in a given time. The dynamics of justice thus reflect the constant social and 
cultural development which is not fully reflected in Law - i.e.  in legal regulation. Hence, 
justice is a determining factor in social change via International Law: its dynamics is 
transferred to the legal international corpus juris, which will only be perfect when in line 
with the moral or cultural social context it is supposed to protect. From a legal-
philosophical point of view, justice corresponds to the demand and to the application of 
what is fair according to axiological regulatory principles of a specific society.   
 
2.2. The International ‘Moral Community’ 
The concept of an international community linked by universal ethics (not to be 
confused with an international society diplomatically disguised as international 
‘community’) puts in practice the ethically based approach to universalism,  what 
Linklater (1996) describes as ‘moral community’. A community that, though subject to 
change, allows the individual to build his own history and to induce progress in the 
social system. 
Within the context of an international order in a process of globalization, building a 
‘moral community’ may serve as a means to affirm the ethical element in a universal 
International Law undergoing an institutionalization, socialization and humanization 
process (Carrillo Salcedo, 1984)  and whose potential for change is huge. This process 
finds echo in the International Law regarding human beings and objectives referred to 
by Bedjaoui (1991), in Simma's Law of communitarian intention (1994) or in the 
Humanity Law suggested by Abi-Saab (1991). However, this process - potentially 
positive - should be carefully conducted and assessed so as to avoid “the return to 
anarchy under the disguise of community”8
Morality is the social glue and must be historically and socially translated in an 
axiological and legal understanding at a given moment. The issue here is how this can 
be done without there being a rupture with modernity. Critical theoreticians claim it can 
be done (Richmond, 2011); post-structuralists say it is not possible (Hawley, 2001). 
 (Pureza, 2005: 1180). 
                                                        
8  Translation from the original in Spanish “el regresso a la anarquía bajo el disfraz de la comunidade” 
(Pureza, 2005: 1180). 
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The concept of ‘moral community’ may help to solve the problem from a plural yet not 
sectarian perspective; in a rising (plural) perspective rather than from an imposing one 
(universalism without legitimacy). The issue lies also in determining how legitimacy is 
possible without a World State arising and simultaneously denying the particularistic 
perspective that legitimacy only derives from the State. Two possibilities immediately 
arise: either you trust reformed international organizations (although deep reforms are 
not feasible in the near future); or international society is kept loose, unstructured and 
thus legitimacy is given to ethnically and culturally based communities without a State 
system being again implemented. However, from another perspective, the plural multi-
level system may provide yet other solutions. 
Within this theoretical context, we must therefore understand what unites plural legal 
scenarios. Global issues cannot be contained and regulated within State borders. Thus, 
considering that issues related to shared assets are at stake, regional or global solution 
must be found. However, that solution may be expressed plurally or asymmetrically 
(for different starting points) and distributively. This suggests the need for a regulation 
through directives (principles and objectives). A multi-level approach could make sense 
here. Far from any World State idea, this would aim to join solidarity responses in one 
system, considering that the items in that system would meet in contexts of different 
needs, capacities and identities. Legitimacy must no longer be a prerogative exclusive 
to the sovereign State. Therefore, and using Habermas's (2008) ideas on this matter, 
supra-state institutions may provide legitimacy without resorting to the World State 
concept - which would otherwise be the only means of providing legitimacy at 
international level. On the other hand, this means accepting that plurality or opposition 
of legal regimes is the current legal and political platform. The biggest issue may be 
homogeneity of knowledge, perception and methodology regarding this plurality 
(Koskenniemi, 2005), which is exactly what critical theory approaches aim to 
overcome. 
Ethical and legal plurality poses several challenges to contemporary International Law, 
considering that the latter imposes values to local communities which they do not 
share. The concept of a plural world contends that there are sets of different and 
unchangeable values; these values may conflict in certain circumstances; the response 
to these conflicts cannot be assessed as good or bad; at individual and collective levels 
there are different ways to act according to values and those actions may conflict. 
Thus, there is not one ideal means of social interaction. Thus a universal public order 
would become an imposition on the others (and would inevitably impose global values, 
currently mostly Western liberal values). While the liberal approach fosters respect for 
moral or religious convictions either through tolerance or by ignoring them, from a 
post-positivist perspective, respect for those convictions is carried out through 
compromise (Sandel, 2005). This means paying attention to them, listening to them 
and challenging them. Respect based on communication does not ensure (and does not 
aim to achieve) a consensus regarding those convictions. Rather, in the context of a 
plural society, it is an assumption that allows differences in terms of values, thought 
and legal regimes to coexist. 
Plurality, though, should not mean the denial of universalism. Shaffer says that “the 
normative vision of legal pluralism rather aims to foster transnational and global legal 
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order out of the plural”9
 
 (2012: 673). Universalism evidences the relevance of 
mechanisms being found to provide common answers regarding common issues. This 
may even imply the foundation of a universal public order, but only as an exception - 
better, as a complement - to plurality, which preserves non-reducible differences. As 
such, a multilevel legal system should be built which, within a plural framework, allows 
non-hierarchical dialog and non-hegemonic relations among several social contexts - 
the moral community. This plural universalistic approach organized in a multilevel 
system allows for a leveled approach - the opposite of a totalizing approach - 
dependent on the level of the need for common action. Sousa Santos's statement is 
here relevant: “global occurs locally. One must make local counter-hegemonic to occur 
globally as well” (2001: 79). The most difficult level is the global level because of the 
risk of universal dissemination of hegemonic power relations. In any case, there are 
global legal assets, (e.g. the environment, justice or peace), a (universal) common 
ethics, a (translocal) group ethics and a (local) cultural ethics, all sharing the global 
level ethics and many sharing translocal ethics. This assumption implies the need for 
communicative structures for emancipation that clear the risk of hegemony. Organizing 
pluralism does not imply imposing a homogeneous or even hegemonic universal public 
order but to provide conditions for political legitimacy to create order and respect 
pluralism (Delmas-Marty, 2009).  
3. The ICC and the Universal Public Order 
3.1. A Body of Universal Sovereignty 
Building and developing a public and global legal order - nowadays dominant in the 
thinking on the global system - is based on a liberal perspective of universality founded 
on human reason. The subjective mental process led by the mind of each individual 
becomes the shared element on which universalism is based. Kant's (2009) ideals of a 
cosmopolitan Law and a world republic based on reason are at the starting point of 
universalistic thought regarding predominant public order and influence liberal thinking 
greatly. An element that characterizes modern universalistic concepts is, therefore, the 
existence of a universal reason that allows to see reality objectively and identify a 
single rational perception of the same facts. 
Unlike what occurs with conservative and particularistic10
The mechanisms used to organize global reality go far beyond State in its individual 
perspective. For universalism, International Law must, therefore, comprehensively 
regulate international society in terms of human actions within the jurisdiction of the 
 views of International Law, 
schools focused on universalism claim that universal public order is possible and 
advisable, even if not built on reason (Dellavalle, 2010). These schools share a 
universal concept of public order with a legal core common to international actors and 
institutions towards collective actions for universal goals. According to Tomuschat, 
International Law is a “comprehensive blueprint for social life” (1999: 42).  
                                                        
9  Translation from the original in Portuguese “o global acontece localmente. É preciso fazer com que o local 
contra-hegemónico também aconteça globalmente” (Sousa Santos, 2001: 79). 
10  Particularistic concepts advocate that politics is nothing more than a struggle for power, a phenomenon 
different from and not subject to Law. Considering the need to link internal political process with 
globalization, particularistic concepts arose to refocus the State as a predominant actor in international 
space, thus denying the existence of true international order and preserving its sovereign self-sufficiency. 
On this matter, see, among others, Rabkin (2004), Kagan (2004) or Goldsmith and Posner (2005). 
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State and regarding its actors, namely, the individual. The development of International 
Law and consequently the reinforcement of universal public order are viewed as 
boosters of civilizations because it allows regulation of global phenomena depending on 
universal principles and values defined by reason. 
Incorporating in global public order natural and inalienable rights of the individual is an 
example of this: an individual's situation is no longer viewed as limited to State 
jurisdiction but becomes relevant to the global community. The development of a 
human rights system represents the application of a classic principle in State 
constitution at global level - promotion and protection of fundamental rights of 
individuals within a community. Therefore, it is not a mere constitutionalization process 
of an international human rights system - and subsequent laying down of international 
constitutional rights - but this process also promotes global constitutionalism  
(Gardbaum, 2008), an apologetic version of rational objective universalism (Kowalski, 
2012). This conclusion derives from the predominant liberal perspective on human 
rights focus on the universal individual. However, we must stress that other 
perspectives on human rights may not lead to the same conclusion, namely those who 
believe the individual can only be seen within his or her social and cultural context. 
Therefore, the approach that focuses on collective rights and peoples' rights questions 
the liberal assumption of human universal rights claiming that certain groups (among 
others, religious, social and ethnic groups) may invoke specific rights or specific 
interpretations of those rights, which then do not apply universally but to that group 
alone (Jones, 1999). On the other hand, other approaches question the validity of 
‘Western’ universalized human rights in other social and cultural contexts (Freeman, 
2011). 
International judicialization is a feature of liberal approaches to universal legal order 
(Kingsbury, 2012).  The ICC is evidently part of this universalistic liberal concept 
(Kowalski, 2011). In the context of universal public order, from an institutional point of 
view, ‘sovereign bodies’ tend to be created. The ICC criminal action illustrates it 
assuming typically State functions at the level of global governance. Criminal 
prosecution is a power typical of a State's sovereignty. The creation of the ICC 
represents a break: criminal prosecution can now be exercised in an order beyond the 
State when serious crimes that affect the international community as a whole are 
involved. This international criminal power does not require State authorization. The 
investigation, the arrest warrant or the trial may be initiated by a Court decision and 
they may even be against the will of those States that have primary jurisdiction on the 
case at hand. This occurs in situations where the ICC Prosecutor or the United Nations 
Security Council, pursuant to article 13 of the Rome Statute, have established 
jurisdiction; this may even imply taking on jurisdiction regarding States that are not 
Parties to the Statute.  
The rational universalistic approach to universal public order is not without concerns or 
challenges. Zolo (1997) identifies in his thesis on ‘legal cosmopolitanism’ a set of 
assumptions that, according to the author, pose a series of difficulties and have several 
shortcomings: firstly, the definition of the primacy of International Law and of formal 
equality of States is only apparent because, in practical terms, the differences between 
rich and poor countries necessarily imply a hierarchy in international public order and 
inequality among individuals; secondly, trusting a centralized international jurisdictional 
system is not compatible with the fact that jurisdictional decisions are highly dependent 
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on a small number of powerful States which have excluded themselves from 
international jurisdiction as in an absolutist system; thirdly, it rejects contemporary 
International Law ability to eradicate war; finally, the individual is a subject of 
International Law with limited capacity because there are no jurisdictional mechanisms 
at the international level that ensure them acknowledged human rights. These 
difficulties and shortcomings evidence the weaknesses of the liberal universalistic 
approach. 
In fact, in the current framework of international social relations, the project of 
universal public order, present also in ‘sovereignty bodies’ such as the ICC, runs the 
risk of fostering power dynamics which already influence more or less institutionalized, 
more or less informal mechanisms in international social relations. In this case, the idea 
to limit power and create an international dynamics based on Law may be - more or 
less naively - coopted by other predominant power interactions unduly pursued in the 
name of justice. It would become a Leviathan under a veil of apparent legitimacy 
provided by International Law. 
 
3.2. A Universalizing Liberal Discourse 
Currently, hard criticism has been made against the ICC regarding its fundaments 
which to a certain extent reflects a concern regarding the imposition of ‘Western’ liberal 
ethical-normative solutions (Kowalski, 2011). Two major types of criticism are possible 
here:  one regarding the selectivity of situations for assessment by the ICC, in which 
the ‘liberal West’ is always the prosecutor and never the defendant; another regarding 
the relation between the (prevailing) political and the legal domains. 
In terms of the first type of criticism, a serious accusation heard mostly at political and 
diplomatic levels has given origin to some hostility by the African States towards the 
ICC, in what regards a factual aspect: up to the present all eight situations submitted 
for ICC assessment are related to Africa11. This evidences selectivity in the Court's 
action. The conclusion, based on undeniable facts, has fostered the accusation that the 
ICC is biased in establishing its jurisdiction, and has given rise to at least implicit 
accusations of neo-colonialism12 13
The reasons behind this criticism are essentially political. Discourse based on liberal 
universalism responds through strict observance of the ICC Statute, which includes 
thirty-four African States, making this the most represented group. Thus, if the Court 
opened criminal procedures on the situations in those Africans States, that is due to 
. The argument is that the accusation and the issuing 
of arrest warrants regarding African leaders poses greater threat to international peace 
and security, thus implicitly claiming this is a conflict between peace and justice. 
                                                        
11  Situations in Uganda, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Central African Republic, in Sudan 
(Darfur), in Kenya, in Libya, in the Ivory Coast and in Mali. 
12   These accusations have been heard from several African States that, more or less united in a common 
claim, mostly through the African Union. For example, after an arrest warrant by the ICC against Omar Al 
Bashir there was harsh reaction against the Court's attempt to try African leaders, namely by States that 
are not Parties of the ICC Statute. Another example is the reaction by the African Union in 2011 after an 
arrest warrant was issued by the ICC against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, which asked its Member-
States to ignore the referred warrant. 
13  As if summarizing the concerns of several African States, the then President of the African Union 
Commission, Jean Ping, referred that the ICC discriminates because it is only concerned with crimes 
committed in Africa and ignores those committed by the "Western powers" in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan - see Associated Press “African Union calls on Member States to Disregard ICC Arrest Warrant 
Against Libya’s Gadhafi”, 2 July 2011.                     
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either the States reporting the situation - which is the most common reason14 - or 
because there was strong evidence of serious crimes of relevance to the international 
community as a whole and the States with primary jurisdiction did not want or could 
not able try the case. Thus, more than the relevance of the cases under assessment 
being related to situations in Africa, what is at stake here is rather the injustice 
regarding the fact that some situations remaining unpunished15
The second type of criticism focuses on the relation between jurisdictional action and 
politics, as a perversion of the function and independence of the ICC. Several non-
governmental human rights organizations have denounced ‘promiscuity’ between 
jurisdictional action and politics with negative effects in international criminal justice 
(Bourdon, 2000). Criticism is evident on the fact that ICC action is excessively 
dependent on the Security Council and therefore that the attribution of jurisdiction it is 
largely determined by political criteria rather than legal criteria. This is a concern 
related to the Statute. In fact, the power of the Security Council on ICC action is laid 
down in the Court’s Statute, namely in articles 13 and 16. 
.  
Article 13 b) lays down that the Security Council may submit a situation to the 
Prosecutor in which there is evidence of serious crimes having been committed and 
which are under the ICC competence. Therefore, of the eight situations under analysis, 
two were submitted by the Security Council16
This criticism is based on the fact that submission of cases to the ICC is dependent on 
political decision criteria different than admission criteria typical of a jurisdictional body 
as the ICC. Moreover, of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council three are not Parties in the Rome Statute: China, the United States of America, 
and Russia. Considering that they have veto power
. This power awarded to the Security 
Council has received much criticism since the preparatory work on the ICC Statute: this 
includes criticism on the fact that the Court thus loses independence and credibility to 
those claiming that the Security Council has no competence in international criminal 
law under the Charter of the United Nations or even others stating that this leads to 
selectivity in establishing jurisdiction (Yee, 1999).  
17
The power of the Security Council laid down in article 16 of the Statute is, however, the 
one that has been pointed out as representing the most serious political interference. 
According to that article, the Security Council may decide to suspend an ongoing ICC 
criminal inquiry or procedure for a renewable period of twelve months. The Security 
, any situation that takes place 
within their territory or involves their nationals would certainly never be submitted to 
the Court via the Security Council. This reinforces the idea that the Court jurisdiction 
may be selective, and in accordance with the dynamics of the Security Council. 
                                                        
14  The situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, the Ivory Coast 
and Mali. 
15  The existence of armed conflict is a good indicator that serious internationally relevant crimes may occur. 
Therefore, in 2012 there were 32 armed conflicts, most of which in Africa, Asia and the Middle East; six of 
these 32 were war-like (over 1000 casualties a year). Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia and 
Sudan (Themnér e Wallensteen, 2013). Noteworthy is also the fact the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC 
is preliminarily analyzing the following situations: Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, North Korea 
and Nigeria. These situations under preliminary assessment include facts allegedly committed by official 
and pro-governmental forces, opposition forces and foreign forces (OTP, 2013). Moreover, of the five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council three are not Parties to the Rome Statute: 
China, the United States of America, and Russia. According to 2012 data, these three States are exactly 
those which have the highest annual expenditure on the military (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2012).   
16  The situations in Sudan (Darfur) and in Libya. 
17  See articles 27, n. º 3 of the Charter of the United Nations Charter and 13 b) of the ICC Statute.  
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Council has even approved resolutions awarding immunity to people involved in peace 
operations at the service of a State that is not a Party to the ICC Statute18. We may 
even argue that this is an amendment to the Rome Statue by the Security Council 
(Jain, 2005). This, on the one hand, clashes with the objective of the fight against 
impunity on serious international crimes and, on the other hand, it evidences the 
degree of interference that the Security Council is willing to undertake19
In the case of the crime of aggression, the role of the Security Council is even more 
relevant. The conference to revise the ICC Statute, which was held in Kampala in 2010, 
introduced the crime of aggression - not initially defined in the Statute – laying down 
that the Court's jurisdiction would depend on previous establishment by the Security 
Council that an act of aggression has been committed
.  
20
Underlying this criticism of the role of the Security Council towards the ICC is a concern 
with the performance of functions by an executive body that is focused on the 
restricted circle of its permanent members and which has no real political or 
jurisdictional control mechanisms (Kowalski, 2010). The liberal discourse does not 
provide any other argument for this concern except that the intervention of the 
Security Council in the ICC was the result of a necessary consensus to create the Court. 
.         
 
3.3. Elements of Pluralism 
The Rome Statute reflects an understanding that, at least from a formalistic point of 
view, is one that puts at center the protection and promotion of a minimal common 
ethics for humanity. The mission to fight impunity and promote justice is awarded to 
the ICC by the Statute from an ultima ratio perspective and aiming to ensure diversity 
of legal systems and of participating social actors. 
Firstly, there is a universal ethical and legal consensus on the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, considered unacceptable according to any community's ethical 
code, genocide21, crimes against humanity22 and crimes of war23 24. These are the 
crimes under ICC jurisdiction that the Rome Statute describes as “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”25
                                                        
18  See, for example, Resolutions S/RES/1422, of 12 July 2002, and S/RES/1487, of 12 June 2003.  
. This is also why the 
Rome Statute rejects any immunity regime that prevents the ICC from exercising 
19  The ICC is analyzing the post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2007-2008 in which several crimes against 
humanity were allegedly committed. Among those accused are Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, 
President and Vice-President of Kenya, respectively. Kenya, upon a decision by the African Union, 
requested that the Security Council delayed any procedure by the ICC regarding the situation in Kenya for 
12 months, under article 16 of the ICC Statute. In a meeting on 15 November 2013, the Security Council 
decided not to delay by one vote. 
20  See UN Depository Notification C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8, 29 November 2010. The Court may exercise 
jurisdiction if the Security Council does not pronounce any decision within six months after being informed 
by the Prosecutor of intention to open inquiry regarding an act of aggression. 
21  This corresponds to the actions aimed at destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group (article 6 of the Rome Statute). 
22  This corresponds to the crimes committed within a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population, which results in a violation of International Law on Human Rights (article 7 of the Rome 
Statute). 
23  This corresponds to violations of Humanitarian International Law, in particular when committed as part of 
a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such acts (article 8 of the Rome Statute).   
24  Although the crime of aggression is included in article 5 of the Rome Statute, its definition and inclusion in 
the ICC jurisdiction has not been concluded. A definition and the jurisdiction criteria for the crime of 
aggression were reached in the 2010 Kampala conference to revise the Statute. Those amendments are 
not yet in force.   
25  See paragraph 9 of the preamble to the Rome Statute.   
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jurisdiction regarding these crimes26. This is an exception (that is not unanimous) when 
compared to other international criminal immunity regimes27
The last legitimizing source of the legal criminal order must be searched in the social 
system, in its axiological order(s) (Figueiredo Dias, 1996). As Saraiva refers on the 
crimes typified in the Rome Statute, “violence and cruelty are universal and timeless” 
(2013: 48). The list of crimes under the ICC jurisdiction does, therefore, derive from 
consensus on minimal common ethics, allowing for identification of ‘interests of the 
global community’ which legitimize universal action to protect them
.    
28
Secondly, the Rome Statute claims the precedence of all States to exercise their 
criminal jurisdiction on those responsible for international crimes. This means that the 
ICC is a last resort court that only exercises jurisdiction subsidiarily.  
 - dignity, 
fundamental rights and justice for the individual and his or her community.   
Complementarity is thus a relevant principle of the ICC jurisdiction, which means that, 
pursuant to article 1 of the Rome Statute, the ICC complements national criminal 
jurisdictions - which have the main competence - and exercises its jurisdiction only 
when these choose not to or have no ability to try29 30
Thirdly, we must not neglect the fact that there is a concern regarding representation 
of different legal and judicial systems in the ICC. In fact, one of the criteria for electing 
the 18 Court judges is the need to ensure that the main legal systems in the world are 
represented there
. This subsidiary position 
regarding national jurisdictions aims also to foster States to open criminal procedures 
in case of extremely serious crimes (Kleffner, 2008). Complementariness of the ICC 
ensures its subsidiarity to local jurisdictional systems and, therefore, its non-hegemonic 
position.    
31. However, it is also true that this is a criminal jurisdictional system 
essentially accusatory, closer to the Anglo-Saxon judicial system. Other criteria, such 
as equitable geographic representation32 and equitable representation of female and 
male judges33
Organizations and individuals have made a mark in the Court and contributed to the 
ICC more independent functioning concerning simplistic power considerations and State 
political interests. Referring to the creation of the ICC, it is noteworthy that in the 
diplomatic conference which adopted in 1998 the Rome Statute, two hundred and 
thirty-seven non-governmental organizations from all over the world were accredited
 evidence the diversity in terms of perspectives within the Court.   
34
 
. 
Those organizations had a direct influence in the writing of some of the Statute 
preamble through their participation in the conference (Struett, 2008). Moreover, non-
governmental organizations were always in close contact with serious human rights' 
violations, documenting and denouncing those situations. Their contribution may be 
decisive for reporting and investigating some cases (HRF, 2004).   
                                                        
26  Article 27 of the Rome Statute. 
27  For example, the regime laid down in the Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in Vienna, on 18 
April 1961. 
28  For example, the International Court of Justice, in its decision on the Reserves towards the Convention on 
Genocide, stated that the Convention on Genocide expressed community's common interest rather than 
States' individual interests (ICJ, 1951).  
29  The principle of complementarity is opposed to the primacy that ad hoc courts for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda have towards national criminal jurisdictions. 
30  We must also stress that "not being able to try" which can determine complementary intervention by the 
ICC includes cases in which the suspects have been covered by amnesty (Cassese, 2008).  
31  Article 36, paragraph 8 i) of the Rome Statute. 
32  Article 36, paragraph 8 ii) of the Rome Statute. 
33  Article 36, paragraph 8 iii) of the Rome Statute. 
34  See UN Document A/CONF.183/INF/3, 5 June 1998.  
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4. Conclusion  
 Focusing on the organization ethics of international society necessarily implies 
criticizing and overcoming rational universalism. Building the universal based on a 
purely rational process is an epistemological error - it neglects the subjective dimension 
that is typical of any human phenomenon. This error easily leads to a dispute on who 
has the competence to define true axioms. A dispute that, in turn, is inevitably won by 
those (States, organizations, universities, individuals, companies, networks, etc.) with 
power to export their vision and impose their interests, more or less coercively. The 
term is ‘hegemony’. Hegemony not only in ethical terms, but also as a moral divide 
which sees peripheries as the only pariahs and the developed center as the moral 
beacon which behaves in the correct manner.   
Thus, basing concerted international action on minimal common ethics - a rather more 
complex and indeterminate process, not very immediate-solution-friendly (these being 
potentially simplistic solutions) frequently required in everyday life - is a counter-
hegemonic antidote. The concept is based on two assumptions: non-reducible 
differences; common phenomena that require collective potentially universal response 
dependent on the scope of that phenomenon. Universalism respects a common ethics 
that may be operationalized through human communication ability, including within the 
framework of a multilevel architecture that includes a universal level. At its core it is an 
ethical pluralist system with pluralist traits regarding a common ethics - socially 
identified and not hegemonically imposed or disseminated - and phenomena common 
to all humanity at a given time: human being's spirit of cooperation and solidarity may 
imply, in certain circumstances, a universal common action. The fight against impunity 
when serious internationally relevant crimes are at stake, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity or crimes of war, effectively requires criminal action at universal 
level. An action that is based on the acknowledgment that human dignity and justice 
are part of the minimal common ethics. 
The ICC is immersed in stormy waters where it is not always possible to separate a 
universalizing liberal approach from an ethical universal approach. On the one hand, its 
quality as a quasi constitutional body that easily becomes part of the ‘universal legal 
order’, as well as its excessive dependency regarding the United Nations Security 
Council and other powers (whose cooperation it depends on) integrate the Court in a 
rational universal liberal approach. The still few successful cases have contributed to 
the distrust regarding the Court ever fulfilling its role or even to the idea that this was 
created as a means of soothing consciences but allowing gaps that ensure impunity of 
the most powerful. On the other hand,  the order of fundamental and (apparently) 
universally shared values visible in the typified crimes, the fact that it is a last resort 
court or even the search for guaranteeing that diversification of legal traditions and 
actors is maintained, all include the ICC in an approach closer to ethical universalism. 
Now, going back to our initial question, whether we can claim that the ICC - even if 
partially and at times serving as a tool for hegemony - is essentially defined by the 
universalization of the fight against impunity by reference to a minimal common ethics. 
Universal application of certain values and principles can be positive. However, for it to 
have legitimacy beyond a political and economic hegemony apparently ethical, it must 
be based on other paradigms. The ICC must be seen as a (good) path towards the 
defense and promotion of human dignity and justice, which will always require caution 
against its instrumentalization. 
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